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The Specter of Copyism v.
Blockheaded Authors: How
User-Generated Content Affects
Copyright Policy
Tom W. Bell*

ABSTRACT

Technological advances, because they have radically lowered
the costs of creating and distributingexpressive works, have shaken the
foundations of copyright policy. Once, those who held copyrights in
sound recordings, movies, television shows, magazines, and the like
could safely assume that the public would do little more than passively
consume. Now, though, the masses have seized (peacefully acquired,
really) the means of reproducing copyrighted works, making
infringement cheap, easy, and, notwithstanding the law's dictates,
widespread. Copyright holders thus understandably fear that their
customers have begun to treat expressive works like common property,
free for all to use. That, the specter of copyism, does risk upsetting
copyright policy, leading to a market failure in the production of
expressive works. Even as we recognize that threat, however, we should
also appreciate that technological advances have greatly reduced the
costs of creating and distributingnew works of authorship. Thanks to
those savings, we can increasingly count on authors who care little
about the lucre of copyright-"blockheads," as Samuel Johnson called
them-to supply us with original expressive works.
This article
*
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describes the economic push and pull between distributed infringement
and distributed authorship-between copyism and blockhead-created
content, we might say-and discusses how copyright policy should
mediate between those forces.
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Technological advances, because they have radically lowered
the costs of creating and distributing expressive works, have shaken
the foundations of copyright policy. Once, those who held copyrights
in sound recordings, movies, television shows, magazines, and the like
could safely assume that the public would do little more than
passively consume their expressive works. Now though, the masses
have won the means of reproducing copyrighted works, making
infringement cheap, easy, and, notwithstanding the law's dictates,
widespread. Copyright infringement has thus increased.
Copyright holders understandably fear that their customers
have begun, in practice if not theory, to treat expressive works like
common property, free for all to use. That, the "specter of copyism,"
does pose some risk of upsetting copyright policy, leading to a market
failure in the production of expressive works. Even as we confront
that specter, however, we should also appreciate that technological
advances have greatly reduced the costs of creating and distributing
new works of authorship.
Thanks to those savings, we can
increasingly count on authors who care little about the lucre of
copyright-"blockheads," as Samuel Johnson called them-to supply
us with original expressive works. This article describes the economic
push and pull between distributed infringement and distributed
authorship-between copyism and blockhead-created content, we
might say-and how copyright policy should mediate those economic
forces.
Part I offers a modestly revised version of the standard
economic model of copyright. That groundwork prepares us for Part
II, which paints the specter of copyism. Part III introduces copyright
blockheads-authors who do not require remuneration-by-copyright to
stimulate them to produce and distribute expressive works. Part IV
explains how copyright policy should adapt, in theory at least, to the
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combined effects of copyism's distributed
blockheaded authors' distributed authorship.

infringement

and

I. AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF COPYRIGHT
Copyright, Justice
Holmes
explained,
"restrains the
spontaneity of men where but for it there would be nothing of any
kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit,"' namely, freely copying
others' expressions. How can we justify that limitation? Courts and
2
commentators explain copyright as a response to market failure.
This Part elaborates on that explanation, first offering the standard
economic model of copyright and then amending it to describe the
effects of copyright infringement.
Creating a work often costs an author a lot, whereas copying a
work usually costs others very little. 3 Absent copyright, then, authors
might find it discouragingly difficult to recoup the expense of creating
fixed expressive works. Authors might then under-produce expressive
works and, in consequence, the public might suffer a poverty of
expression.
To avoid that policy tragedy, the Copyright Act of 1976
(Copyright Act, or the Act) empowers authors to control the reuse of
their fixed expressive works. 4 By selling those special statutory
privileges, authors can offset their production costs. Thus copyright
arguably does what the common law allegedly cannot: ensures that
the public enjoys an adequate supply of expressive works. 5
1.
White Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2544, as recognized in M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986); see
also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Walls?: Speculations on Literary Property in the
Library of the Future, 42 REPRESENTATIONS 53, 59 (1993) ("[Copyright law] has
traditionally presumed a world in which, but for copyright, unauthorized reproductions
would be pervasive and unremediable.").
2.
See Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure
in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 758-59 nn.77-82 (2001) (citing
various sources supporting the proposition).
3.
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). This admittedly explains post hoc
legislators' often confused and impenetrable motives. Rather than deflating the dubious
notion that the Copyright Act embodies a natural rights view of copyright, however, it
suffices here to observe that free-rider problems explain legislators' desire to protect even
copyrights qua natural rights, and that a natural rights view of copyright would, at any
rate, leave even less room for fair use.
4.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
5.
The Copyright Act protects only fixed expressive works, granted. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2000). It doubtless stimulates the protection of unfixed works indirectly, however,
as when a jazz musician extemporizes during a performance in order to convince listeners
to buy a recorded version of the unfixed work.
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The benefits of copyright policy come at a price, however.

Although it may cost a great deal to make the first copy of a fixed
expression, it usually costs very little to make and distribute
subsequent copies. Absent copyright protection, those works would
constitute public goods. 6 Ironically, copyright bars the public from
freely enjoying the very goods labeled "public." 7 Instead, the Act vests
copyright holders with the power to charge whatever the market will
bear to escape liability for infringement. Though the monopoly rents
that copyright holders thereby win allegedly provide a necessary
stimulus to create, non-holders suffer the opportunity costs of losing
freer access to fixed expressive works.8 Most commentators thus
understand copyright policy to aim at striking a balance between
giving authors sufficient incentives to create expressive works and
providing the public with adequate access to the works thereby
created.9 Figure 110 illustrates that, the standard economic model of
copyright policy.11

6.
See Landes & Posner, supranote 3, at 327.
7.
That label hardly suffices to establish the proper scope of copyright, of course; it
here serves only wry humor.
8.
Commentators often refer to this a "deadweight loss." See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen,
Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1801 (2000); William W. Fisher
III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1236 (1998). To
clarify the cause of that loss, I prefer the label, "non-holders' opportunity costs."
9.
See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 326 (characterizing this as "the
central problem in copyright law"). But see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004) (arguing that the economics of product
differentiation suggest that the access-incentives tradeoff is not so intractable as generally
believed); infra Part IV (arguing that copyright policy cannot strike a delicate balance
between public and private interests).
10.
For readers accessing this article via a database that does not include the
figures and who would like to access figure 1, see The Standard Economic Model of
Copyright, available at http://www.tomwbell.com/graphics/StandardEconModel.gif (last
visited Mar. 27, 2008).
11.
This portrayal of the standard model comes largely from Yoo, supra note 9, at
227 fig. 1, which both sums up the traditional view among legal academics of the economics
of copyright and corrects it by setting the proper bounds for measuring profit. The chart
here differs from Yoo's, however, in showing average costs to exceed average revenue at low
levels of production. That assumption, while not strictly necessary, doubtless describes
most copyrighted works more accurately.
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Figure 1
1

The Standard Economic Model of Copyright
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As portrayed in figure 1, an author incurs large costs upon
creating a fixed work but very low marginal costs of production (MC)
thereafter. The author's average costs of production (AQ thus drop
with each additional copy he-or, more likely, the party to whom he
sells his copyrighted work-produces. He faces the usual sort of
downward-sloping aggregate demand curve (D), which also marks the
average revenue (AR) he can make by selling any given number of
copies.
How many copies should an author sell? Were social efficiency
the test, he would sell the quantity (Qe) corresponding to the point
where his marginal cost curve crosses the demand curve, earning the
corresponding price (Pe). But that would discourage him (and other
would-be authors) from creating fixed expressive works, as it would
not allow him to recover his average costs. For the author to break
even in the authorship business, he would need to sell at least the
quantity corresponding to the point where his average cost curve
crosses the demand curve (Qs), thereby earning a sustaining price
(Ps). Happily for the author, though, the monopoly privilege afforded
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by copyright law allows him, at least in theory, to sell even fewer
copies (Qm) and at a higher price (Pm). Specifically, he will want to
sell a quantity that corresponds to the point where his marginal
revenue (MR) curve crosses his marginal cost curve. At higher
quantities his marginal costs would exceed his marginal revenues,
resulting in marginal losses.
If our hypothetical author manages to sell at the monopoly
quantity and price that maximize his benefits, he will earn profits
(HP) equal to the amount his revenue exceeds the amount necessary
to recoup his average costs. In that event, consumers to whom he sells
will enjoy a surplus (CS) representing the difference between what
they pay and how much they value his work. Non-holders unwilling to
pay what he demands, however, will suffer opportunity costs (NO)
equal to how much they would have paid for the uses barred by his
asserted copyright.
We could doubtless say more about the standard economic
4
13
model of copyright, adding complications, 12 quibbles, and criticisms.'
I will do so below when I argue for separating copyright's aggregate
demand and average revenue curves.' 5 For now though, let us assume
that figure 1 offers a conventional and useful economic model of
copyright.
II. THE SPECTER OF COPYISM LOOMS
"[S]eize the means of reproduction!"' 6 Feminists adopted that
cry to rouse women to claim their rights to their bodies, and to
demand a fair say in how child-bearing and rearing institutions
work.' 7 We might hear the same cry, voiced with a different aim, in
the battle now raging over the means of reproducing expressive works.
Copyright holders claim the right to control whether and how nonholders can use copyrighted works. The people, having won access to
photocopying machines, computers, network communications, and
other means of copying and distributing expressive works, largely
ignore the demands of copyright. In that social movement-one
12.
We might, for instance, add a variety of average cost curves to illustrate how
works with different production costs fare under a given level of copyright protection.
See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 8, at 1238-39 (arguing that price discrimination can
13.
both increase copyright holders' profits and decrease non-holders opportunity costs).
14.
See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 9, at 231-35 (criticizing the standard model as
deficient on a number of grounds).
15.
See infra Part II.
16.
(1993).

17.

JENNY CHAPMAN, POLITICS, FEMINISM AND THE REFORMATION OF GENDER 207

See id. (analyzing the views of feminist scholar Shulamith Firestone).
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driven not by ideology but by technological and market forcescopyright holders see the specter of copyism. This Part describes that
phantom and explains why it haunts copyright policy.
On the standard economic view of copyright, as on the
economic view of other monopolies, average revenue equals demand.
Those two measures trace one and the same line. Why? Because, for
most products and services, consumption closely matches supply at
the market-clearing price. Sales reveal consumer demand and, in the
case of copyright and other supposed monopolies, only one seller reaps
revenue from those sales. For that reason, for instance, the average
revenues generated by a utility's sales faithfully track aggregate
consumer demand for electric power.
Even a so-called monopolist might face competition, however.
An electrical utility might, for example, suffer losses such as
unauthorized taps on power lines, competition from home-generated
electricity, and consumers switching to gas appliances. So, too, might
the sole authorized seller of hard liquor fail to capture the entire
market of drinkers, losing some customers to the resale of stolen goods
and other customers to moonshine.
The caveats to "monopoly" prove especially strong in the case of
copyright, which permits some uses of protected works, such as fair
uses, that copyright holders do not authorize, and which fails to
prevent other unauthorized uses that qualify as copyright
infringements. We might fairly say that the former category of uses,
because copyright holders have no statutory power to bar them, do not
really cut into the market share for a copyrighted work. On that view,
copyright holders cannot lose what they never had. Thus, I focus here
on infringing uses. The general point stands, however: whether due to
permitted or forbidden uses, a copyright holder never commands all of
the market for an expressive work.
That conflict between theory and facts shows why we should
perhaps avoid speaking of "the copyright monopoly" and instead
discuss copyright in terms of market power.18 Whether or not it hands
out monopolies, after all, the Copyright Act does give a powerful
subsidy to those it protects: the privilege of invoking State power to
inhibit infringing uses of expressive works. The standard economic
model of copyright usefully captures that effect, but somewhat
exaggerates it. We can get a more accurate picture of copyright by
separating consumer demand from average revenue.

18.

See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE TEXT 244-45 (1986)

(explaining the ubiquity of monopolistic competition).
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The consumption of an expressive work-and thus the revealed
demand for it-may greatly exceed the supply legally permitted under
copyright law. Effectively, some consumers treat copyrighted works
like public goods, paying only the very low marginal costs that they
must bear to enjoy each unauthorized use. That payment typically
comes not in cash but in the opportunity costs, expended through time
and effort, of copying. In any event, none of it goes to copyright
But
holders, leaving them aggrieved and, sometimes, litigious.
copyright holders seldom find it worthwhile, or even possible, to fully
defend their rights under the Copyright Act. Many infringing acts go
Figure 219
undetected or for other reasons elude enforcement.
case
of a given
in
the
how,
illustrates that phenomenon by showing
copyrighted work, aggregate consumer demand (D) measured in terms
of consumer use, might diverge from the average revenue (AR)
generated by the work's copyright.

For readers accessing this article via a database that does not include the
19.
figures and that who would like to access figure 2, see Demand and Average Revenue for
http://www.tomwbell.com/graphics/
at
available
Expressions,
Copyrighted
D vAR forj(C).gif (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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Figure 2
Demand and Average Revenue for Copyrighted Expressions
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Copyright holders understandably object when, due to
infringement, they earn less revenue than the law entitles them to
earn. But why should the rest of us care? Recall that copyright aims
to cure a looming market failure: we will suffer an undersupply of
expressive works if authors cannot recoup their production costs.
Copyright aims to cure that failure by giving authors the privilege of
controlling, and thus profiting from, certain uses of their works.
Infringement threatens to upset that statutory mechanism, depriving
authors and their transferees of revenue that might otherwise
stimulate the production and distribution of expressive works.
We might call that threat, after Marx and Engels, "the specter
of copyism." 20 And, as the allusion to communism suggests, we should
all worry that poverty will follow if production does not pay. In the
See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Samuel H.
20.
Beer ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts 1955) (1848).
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case of copyright policy, in other words, we should worry that
infringement will decrease copyright holders' revenues below the level
necessary to sustain authorship. As figure 321 illustrates, such a
development would threaten to deprive the public of new expressive
works.
Figure 3
When Unauthorized Uses Discourage Authorship

1

I

Quantity

As figure 3 indicates, infringement threatens to drive a wedge
between aggregate consumer demand for a work (D) and the average
copyright revenue (AR) generated by the work. Depending on the
work's average cost curve (AC) infringement might thereby stymie the
production of original expressive works. A copyright holder might not
find it worthwhile to produce a work absent the prospect of recovering
at least her average costs. A profit-seeking copyright holder would
thus avoid the market pictured in figure 3, even though consumers
For readers accessing this article via a database that does not include the
21.
figures and who would like to access figure 3, see When Unauthorized Uses Discourage
Authorship, available at http://www.tomwbell.comlgraphics/Specter.gif (last visited Mar.
27, 2008).
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would willingly expend more than the work's average cost to have it.
Thus might the specter of copyism curse us with market failure.
III. COPYRIGHT BLOCKHEADS TO THE RESCUE

Samuel Johnson claimed: "No man but a blockhead ever wrote,
except for money." 22 He would doubtless have said the same about the
other media-music, painting, motion pictures, computer software,
and so forth-that copyright law later came to cover. Regardless of
how they express themselves, savvy authors demand remuneration for
their creative labors. Copyright helps to ensure that they get it.
Yet, "blockheaded" authors exist. Some percentage of authors
will, at least sometimes, share their expressive works for very little or
no pay. In rare cases, an author, eager for attention or burning with
artistic passion, may even pay others to hear her message. 23 We need
not specify what motivates such authors (though we should call them
"blockheads" with affection, only; they are seldom fools). We need only
observe that, as Johnson himself impliedly recognized, non-monetary
incentives sometimes suffice to inspire authorship.
Blockheaded authors, like any authors, face fixed and marginal
costs. Blockheaded authors do not rely on copyright law to recoup
those expenses, however. Instead, they subsidize the costs of creating
and distributing their works, paying for them out-of-pocket and then,
typically, releasing them to the public.
Blockheaded authors
effectively pay to satisfy their own demand for their own works, in
other words, solipsistically supplying a market comprising a single
consumer. Rather than tracking the average revenue generated by
blockheaded authors' works, therefore, we should track the average
subsidy for blockheadedness.
Figure 424 does so with the curve
marked AS, for aggregate subsidy, showing how it might relate to a
blockheaded author's production and distribution costs.

22.
JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 641 (1992) (1791).
23.
Much more commonly, advertisers and other patrons will pay an author and
ask for nothing but attention from the public.
24.
For readers accessing this article via a database that does not include the
figures and who would like to access figure 4, see When Average Costs Exceed Average
Subsidies, Discouraging Blockheaded Authorship, available at http://www.tomwbell.com/
graphics/NoBlockheads.gif (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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Figure 4
When Average Costs Exceed Average Subsidies,
Discouraging Blockheaded Authorship

AS

= AverageSubsidy

CAC

Quantity

As did figure 3, figure 4 portrays a sort of tragedy. Here,
though, the costs of creating and distributing a fixed work exceed the
subsidy that its blockheaded author would have paid. Thus, for
instance, many a wannabe rock star has lacked sufficient funds to cut
The tragedy extends beyond mere artistic frustration,
a single.
however. Assuming that a blockheaded author's creations would have
found some willing audience, no matter how small, that author's
silence represents a lost opportunity to increase social wealth.
More and more often, non-monetary incentives suffice to
Thanks to the same technological magic
stimulate authorship.
blamed for summoning the specter of copyism, authors find it
increasingly cheap-in terms of money, time, and effort-to produce
Whereas it once took many
and distribute expressive works.
thousands of dollars to record and nationally distribute a new song,
for instance, it now takes only a couple of thousand dollars to get a
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computer, music production software, and an Internet connection. 25
Now, almost anybody with a dream and guitar can get a clean shot at
the world's ear. 26 Figure 527 illustrates this effect, charting how
technological progress has lowered the average and marginal costs of
supplying the market with original expressive works.
Figure 5
Effect of Technological Advances on Supply of Blockheads'
Original Expressive Works

Average Cost
Marginal Cost
Price of blockhead's subsidy
Quantity of blockhead's output
at earlier time
at later time

Quantity

Figure 5 also illustrates how reductions in the costs of
producing and distributing original expressive works encourage
blockheaded authors to create. A blockheaded author with an average
25.
See David Byrne, The Fall and Rise of Music, WIRED, Jan. 2008, at 124, 127,
available
at
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/magazine/16-O 1/ffyorke?
currentPage=all.
26.
It offers an attractive target; even I admit to drawing a bead on it. See Tom W.
Bell's Music, available at http://www.tomwbell.com/music.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008)
(offering some of the author's original musical compositions and sound recordings).
27.
For readers accessing this article via a database that does not include the
figures and who would like to access figure 5, see Effect of Technological Advances on
Supply of Blockheads' Original Expressive Works, available at http://www.tomwbell.com/
graphics/Tech4Blockheads.gif (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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subsidy curve (AS) that passes above the author's average cost curve
(AC) will find it worthwhile to pay the subsidy price (Pb) to produce an
output equal to Qb-a blockheaded quantity of the work. Overall
welfare increases because the blockheaded author relishes selfexpression and non-authors get an original expressive work. Figure 5
does not include a demand curve illustrating how much those nonauthors would pay-in currency, time, or effort-to access the
blockhead's work. You could draw that sort of curve almost anywhere
on the graph. So long as it somewhere exceeds their very low
marginal costs of accessing the work, consumers will enjoy a surplus.
So understood, and holding all else equal, the willingness of
blockheaded authors to subsidize the production and distribution of
expressive works will tend to render copyright's legal restrictions
inefficiently over-protective. In a relatively primitive world, such as
the United States in the late 1700s, we might find that non-monetary
incentives do not stimulate an adequate supply of expressive works.
Copyright, by helping to ensure that authors get paid for their
expressions, can help to remedy that market failure. So, at least, the
Founders evidently thought. 28 As technology advances, however, and
the costs of supplying original expressive works drop, so too does the
number of authors for whom the lucre of copyright proves a necessary
stimulus drop. 29 Thanks to decreases in the costs of creating original
expressive works, authorship need not entail crushing debts. Thanks
to the very low marginal costs of reproducing and distributing such
works, moreover, relatively few blockheaded authors can entertain a
very large market.
Those technological and economic trends tend, over time, to
cure the same market failure targeted by copyright policy. They
ensure that non-monetary incentives will suffice to stimulate an
increasing amount of authorship and that blockheaded authors will
thus supply more and more of the market's demand for expressive
works. At some limit, for some works, copyright law will eventually
prove superfluous, and its burdens will exceed its benefits. Volunteer
programmers might, for instance, supply computer operating system
software free of charge. 30 Generally, then, as methods for producing
and distributing expressive works grow increasingly efficient, they
28.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

29.
That is not to say that copyright has nothing to offer authors driven by nonmonetary incentives. Authors who seek fame may, in particular, find copyright useful. It is
only to say that, even for such authors, copyright may offer more protection than necessary.
30.
With regard to Linux operating system software, of course, they already have
supplied it for free. See Jem Matzan, The Gift Economy and Free Software, LINUx.coM,
June 5, 2004, http://www.linux.com/articles/36554.
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tend to tip copyright policy into inefficiency, making it more restrictive
than necessary or proper for promoting the general welfare.
IV. How COPYRIGHT POLICY SHOULD ADAPT
While rightly shuddering at the specter of copyism, we should
also recognize that the unauthorized use of copyrighted works can, if it
does not go so far as to undercut authors' incentives, increase social
welfare. Consider, for instance, an impoverished entrepreneur relying
on pirated software to start her business. Supposing that she could
not afford to buy an authorized copy, and that her unauthorized use
would not depress software production, her infringement would
generate a welcome consumer surplus. The same would hold true of,
say, someone who enjoys an infringing copy of a CD despite being
unwilling to pay its retail price. 3 1 As figure 632 illustrates, those
exceptions to the strict enforcement of copyright law could, in theory,
benefit us all without discouraging the production and distribution of
expressive works.

31.
Both examples assume that the copyright holder does not price discriminate
sufficiently well to offer a market for such unpaying uses.
32.
For readers accessing this article via a database that does not include the
figures and who would like to access figure 6, see When Unauthorized Uses Increase
Consumer Surplus, available at http://www.tomwbell.com/graphics/BonusPts.gif (last
visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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Figure 6
When Unauthorized Uses Increase Consumer Surplus

Consumer Surplus of Unauthorlzed Users
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In figure 6, we see unauthorized and non-paying uses
effectively competing with revenue-generating uses that respect
copyright. Authorized users of the work pay the copyright holder price
Pm to enjoy the work. That prices some law-abiding customers out of
the market-those non-holders who forego the work rather than
infringe it. They suffer the opportunity costs marked by area NO.
Those sorts of economic and legal constraints do not trouble
unauthorized users, however.
They pay for the work not via
copyright's toll, but rather by taking a path around the law. Those
unauthorized users typically do not have notable fixed start-up costs;
they basically pay only their marginal costs (MC) to access
convriyhted works. Those outlaws typically do not pay in coin, but
rather in terms of time, effort, and risk. The surplus gains of such
unauthorized uses thus fill the area below the aggregate demand
curve (D) and above the average revenue curve (AR), all the way down
to where D crosses MC.
The large consumer surpluses in figure 6 look appealing,
especially since they co-exist with copyright holders' monopoly profits.
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Figure 6 surely offers too sanguine a view of the effects of copyright
infringement, however. Without the limitations imposed by copyright
law, some consumers who would otherwise willingly pay for
authorized uses might instead opt to save their money by joining the
non-paying masses of unauthorized users. The market would thus not
continue to support the monopoly price (Pm) for the monopoly
quantity (Qm). Under competitive pressure, the demand curve for the
authorized uses of the work would sink. If any copyright holders
remained in such an un-remunerative market, they would eventually
find that they could sell their works only at their marginal costs.
Consumer migration from respecting copyright to infringing it thus
risks triggering the policy tragedy portrayed in figure 5.
How does copyright law dispel that-the specter of copyism?
By imposing high marginal costs on infringing uses of protected
works. Absent the Copyright Act, and especially in digital works, an
infringer would generally face only the same low marginal
reproduction costs as a copyright holder. 33 Under the Copyright Act,
in contrast, an infringer might have to pay actual or statutory
damages, lost profits, costs, and/or attorney's fees to a copyright holder
for every unauthorized use.
How high should lawmakers set the marginal costs of
infringement? We would not want them to under-deter it, lest the
specter of copyism become all too real. Nor would we want them to
overdo the job, given that a modest level of infringement can deliver
social gains. Theory suggests that lawmakers should set the marginal
costs of infringement, taking into account that only some infringing
uses get caught and litigated, just high enough to ensure that
authorized users will have no incentive to opt for paying less than
enough to sustain authorship. MCu should thus equal Ps. Figure 734
illustrates.

33.
That holds especially true of digital works. Works in other media may prove
more difficult to copy without authorization. Now-Justice Breyer described such an effect in
the book publishing industry. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
For readers accessing this article via a database that does not include the
34.
figures and who would like to access figure 7, see Copyright Increases Marginal Costs of
Unauthorized Uses, available at http://www.tomwbell.com/graphics/MCuOriginal.gif (last
visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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Figure 7
Copyright Increases Marginal Costs of Unauthorized Uses
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The story does not end with figure 7, however. Even after the
law artificially inflates the marginal costs of infringing copyrighted
works, we would still see consumers migrate from authorized uses to
unauthorized ones. The market clearing price for a work would thus
tend to settle very close to the marginal cost of infringing the work.
After all, authorized and unauthorized uses of the work effectively
compete. Where the law sets the costs of infringement determines
how much copyright holders stand to earn by enforcing their statutory
rights and, indeed, whether enforcing those rights offers any net gain
at all. Where, then, should lawmakers set MCu?
Copyright policy should not aim to price all unauthorized uses
out of the market. The unauthorized uses that it does allow will,
granted, decrease copyright holders' profits. Copyright policy rightly
aims at affording copyright holders only just enough revenue to cover
their average costs, however.
Any amount above that level
unjustifiably sacrifices the public good. Pricing the marginal costs of
unauthorized use at a level sufficient to allow copyright holders to
recoup their average costs will tend to encourage consumers at the
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margin of refusing to pay for a permitted use to exit the legal market
and enter into unauthorized use. Over time, in the main, and holding
all else equal, we should expect copyright holders' revenues to drop.
Eventually, copyright holders would enjoy no monopoly rents; they
would be able to sell their goods only at sustainable prices, as figure
835 illustrates.
Figure 8
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Effects of Setting Marginal Costs of Unauthorized Uses at
Authorship-Sustaining Price
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Comparing figure 7 with figure 8, we see that competition from
unauthorized uses of the copyrighted work in question has pushed the
average revenue (AR) curve backwards and down. In figure 8, where
consumer demand (D) exceeds the marginal cost that copyright law
imposes on unauthorized uses of the work (MCu), consumers
rationally disregard copyright law. By instead opting to engage in
unauthorized uses of the work, consumers enjoy large surpluses
35.
For readers accessing this article via a database that does not include the
figures and who would like to access figure 8, see Effects of Setting Marginal Costs of
Unauthorized Uses at Authorship-Sustaining Price, available at http://www.tomwbell.com/
graphics/MCuFinal.gif (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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(CSu). Consumers who respect copyright law, but who value the work

at greater than its market price, also enjoy surpluses (CS). Copyright
holders caught in the world portrayed by figure 8 no longer extract
monopoly profits; instead, they find that the market supports sales at
a quantity (Qs) and price (Ps)only just sufficient to recoup the average

costs (AC) of producing the work. Even at that low price, copyright
enforcement still imposes opportunity costs (NO) on consumers who
would have paid less for the work. That constitutes a necessary evil,
however, given that a lower price would leave copyright holders
unable to recoup their costs and, thus, unwilling to supply the market
for expressive works.
So, at least, goes copyright in theory. In practice, as I have
emphasized in a forthcoming book, lawmakers lack both the
information and incentives to calibrate copyright policy so precisely or
so well.3 6 Figure 8 thus illustrates only how copyright law should
work-not how it does work. And, given how copyright policy does
work-as a necessary evil, at best-we would best serve the general
welfare by encouraging the development of alternative mechanisms,
based not in statutory law but in common law, for promoting the
production and distribution of original expressive works. 37 We should,
38
in other words, try to escape copyright.

V. CONCLUSION

Copyright blockheads open the door to a world that will have
no need for copyright's burdensome restrictions.
Encouraged by
reductions in the costs of producing and distributing their expressive
works, more and more blockheaded authors will come out of the
woodwork. Thanks to general growth in wealth, moreover, all authors
will win the means of indulging their creative whims. That steadily
increasing flow of effectively, and sometimes legally,3 9 uncopyrighted
works will join a growing ocean of older works, well preserved, widely

36.

See THOMAS W. BELL, INTELLECTUAL PRIVILEGE: COPYRIGHT, COMMON LAW,

AND THE COMMON GOOD (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at ch. 4, available at
http://www.intellectualprivilege.comlbook.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008)).
37.
See id. (manuscript at ch. 7).
38.
Given that the prevailing defense of copyright casts it as a response to market
failure, common law generally stands accused of doing too little to promote authorship.
Perhaps, though, we should worry that common law might do its job too well, overprotecting intangible goods and so decreasing the public good. So far, at least, it does not
appear that the Supreme Court thinks this problem looms. See Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265-66 (1979) (holding that enforcement of a contract requiring
royalty payments for an unpatented invention did not contravene federal policy).
39.
See BELL, supra note 36 (manuscript at ch. 8.A).
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distributed, and relatively inexpensive to enjoy. Consumers will find
it easier than ever before to satisfy their demand for works of
authorship. Infringement will increase, granted, but copyism will not
haunt the market in expressive works with failure. We will have
outgrown the need for copyright, a well-intended but clumsy, and
ultimately superfluous, policy hack.

